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The present narrative review addresses issues concerning the defining criteria and
conceptual underpinnings of pain catastrophizing. To date, the concept of pain
catastrophizing has been extensively used in many clinical and experimental contexts
and it is considered as one of the most important psychological correlate of pain
chronicity and disability. Although its extensive use, we are still facing important
problems related to its defining criteria and conceptual understanding. At present, there
is no general theoretical agreement of what catastrophizing really is. The lack of a
consensus on its definition and conceptual issues has important consequences on
the choice of the pain management approaches, defining and identifying problems,
and promoting novel research. Clinical and research work in absence of a common
theoretical ground is often trivial. It is very surprising that clinical and experimental
work has grown extensively in the past years, without a common ground in the form
of a clear definition of pain catastrophizing and overview of its conceptual basis.
Improving the efficacy and efficiency of pan catastrophizing related treatments requires
an understanding of the theoretical construct. So far, most interventions have only
demonstrated modest effects in reducing pain catastrophizing. Therefore, clarifying the
construct may be an important precursor for developing more targeted and effective
interventions, thereby easing some of the burden related to this aspect of pain. In our
review, we have extracted and de-constructed common elements that emerge from
different theoretical models with the aim to understand the concept of catastrophizing,
which components can be modulated by psychological interventions, and the general
role in pain processing. The analysis of the literature has indicated essential key elements
to explain pain catastrophizing: emotional regulation, catastrophic worry (as repetitive
negative thinking), rumination, behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation (BIS/BAS)
systems, and interoceptive sensitivity. The present paper attempts to integrate these
key elements with the aim to re-compose and unify the concept within a modern
biopsychosocial interpretation of catastrophizing.
Keywords: catastrophizing, worry, catastrophic worry, rumination, behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation
systems (BIS and BAS), interoceptive sensitivity
If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the thing itself, but to your estimate of it;
and this you have the power to revoke at any moment
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (Tὰ ε’ις ‘εαυτóν)
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INTRODUCTION
In the past 30 years, pain catastrophizing generated substantial
attention and was investigated in many clinical and experimental
studies as an important correlate of pain, pain-related disability,
and outcome (e.g., after surgery and chronification). Notably,
in these years, more than 3,000 articles focusing on pain
catastrophizing were listed in PubMed or Web of Science.
This rising number of publications focusing on a psychological
determinant in pain and pain chronicity emerged as a
consequence of the embracement of the biopsychosocial model
in western medicine at the end of the 20th century. In the same
period, an important shift in paradigms was also observed in
psychology with the introduction of cognitivism in the 1960s,
leading to the emergence of the biopsychosocial perspective. It
was in this framework that Ellis (1962) introduced the construct
of catastrophizing for the first time.
In 1977, George Engel proposed the biopsychosocial model
(Engel, 1977) as an opposition to the dominant biomedical model
derived from Louis Pasteur’s germ theory of disease (1822–1895).
The biomedical model provided important and fundamental
advantages in medicine, but it was based on a dualistic mind-body
viewpoint, and had its own basis in the reductionistic philosophy
that dominated the field of medicine since the Renaissance
(Gatchel et al., 2007).
The biopsychosocial approach has been particularly influential
in the study of pain, since it expanded our knowledge of pain
beyond an exclusive focus on its biomedical pathophysiology.
The biopsychosocial model is now accepted as the most
comprehensive perspective for the understanding and
interdisciplinary treatment of chronic pain disorders (Gatchel,
2004; Gatchel et al., 2007), and cognitive variables such
as pain catastrophizing have been recognized to modulate
pain-related outcomes.
Despite this, the role of psychological interventions as therapy
to reduce pain catastrophizing and their integrated roles in a
biopsychosocial management framework are not fully developed.
In order to develop efficient interventions that achieve the
best treatment outcome, it is imperative to understand the
mechanisms and the potential factors that are behind therapeutic
procedures (Day et al., 2012). For example, is the reduction
in pain catastrophizing a therapeutic mechanism specific to
cognitive-behavioral treatment for chronic pain? (Burns et al.,
2012). Alternatively, are there other mechanisms and factors
that can influence and interact with pain catastrophizing? Most
importantly, what is pain catastrophizing when dissected into its
different components, and which of these components can best
be modulated by cognitive interventions?
Today, we acknowledge that pain catastrophizing is
a multifaced complex construct but, unfortunately, its
understanding does not expand beyond its pragmatic separation
in rumination, magnification, and helplessness.
Pain catastrophizing is a major topic of discussion within
the field of pain management, and a better understanding
may eventually improve and validate cognitive intervention
strategies. A variety of psychological approaches are used for
the management of chronic pain. These span from classical
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and or CBT-multimodal
interventions to the more recent acceptance and commitment
therapy (ACT) and mindfulness-based strategies (Burns et al.,
2012). Although many of these are showing promising treatment
outcomes, we are still lacking knowledge about the mechanisms
underlying favorable effects of psychological therapies for chronic
pain (Day et al., 2012).
Reduction in pain catastrophizing serves as index of changes
in maladaptive cognitions, and therefore represents a therapeutic
mechanism that works to reduce pain and improve functioning
(Burns et al., 2012). However, when the intervention literature
is analyzed, the effect size on pain catastrophizing is merely
modest and unspecific (Schütze et al., 2018). This means
that the reduction in catastrophizing scores associated with
pain modulations are likewise observed in other therapeutic
interventions that are not designed to or do not operate within
a theoretical framework specific for targeting cognitive changes.
Examples of such interventions are education interventions,
physical exercise, or multimodal interventions (Burns et al.,
2012; Schütze et al., 2018). Thus, the great variability observed
in treatment options make it difficult to understand what
mechanisms and variables of pain catastrophizing are subjected
to change and can be underpinned as a potential target for
helping individuals at catastrophizing less.
In order to improve the treatment efficacy of pain
catastrophizing, this must be understood within a common
theoretical framework.
Although several conceptualizations have been proposed, at
the present time there is no general theoretical agreement of what
catastrophizing really is and why it occurs. To date research on
pain catastrophizing has grown enormously despite the absence
of a common contextual framework.
Two extensive and thorough reviews provided by Sullivan
et al. (2001b) and Quartana et al. (2009) have previously
addressed the existence of multiple conceptual models of pain
catastrophizing and noted the persistent controversies regarding
catastrophizing and pain.
In the past decade, continuous investigations on pain
catastrophizing have been conducted, adding novel elements
that can help clarifying the construct. These investigations
include emotional regulation and catastrophic worry as well as
neuropsychological models of personality traits, the behavioral
inhibition system (BIS), and the behavioral activation system
(BAS). Expanding our knowledge and integrating these lines
of research may improve our understanding of the underlying
components of pain catastrophizing.
Thus, the aims of this narrative review are threefold:
(1) de-composing early and modern conceptualizations of
catastrophizing in order to highlight mechanisms and key-
features underlying its concept; (2) re-composing catastrophizing
by integrating these mechanisms and key-features within a
biopsychosocial framework to generate a cohesive understanding
of catastrophizing; (3) enhancing conceptual awareness on which
psychological processes may play an important role in an
interdisciplinary pain management framework.
Based on the available data, an integrated model is suggested
for the mechanisms involved in pain catastrophizing to offer new
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possibilities to understand the nature of this construct, with the
aim to improve multidisciplinary management of chronic pain.
METHODS
The present narrative review is intended as a comprehensive
theoretical resource for addressing the above-mentioned aims.
To our knowledge, no other study has tried to de-construct and
recompose the concept of catastrophizing by extracting basic
principles and processes from existing theoretical models. To our
view, this step is fundamental in order to reach a comprehensive
understanding of this psychological phenomenon and to improve
pain management.
Studies cited in this review have been obtained from searches
in PubMed, Web of Science, and PsycINFO databases, and
through the authors’ familiarity with the published literature
in the field. Clinical, observational and intervention studies,
experimental, qualitative, and review articles were all included
in the search. Articles have been identified using the following
key-search: catastrophizing and pain catastrophizing and their
relationship with rumination, worry, BIS and BAS, catastrophic
worry and interoceptive sensitivity. Furthermore, a hand search
of the relevant references has been undertaken to capture articles
that might have been missed on the initial search. In addition,
references in clinical psychology and pain psychology books have
been consulted in order to have a broad overview of the available
literature. The literature search has been performed in the period
of March–April 2019 and has been updated again in March 2020.
Although this review follows to a large extent the guidelines
for conducting systematic reviews, this is not a systematic review
since the scope of this work is to provide a context for describing,
elaborating, and evaluating a new conceptualization of pain
catastrophizing based on the integration of the reviewed studies.
Studies have been included if they were peer-reviewed articles
and published in English. References have been excluded if
they did not address specifically the role of catastrophizing in
relation to its theoretical framework or included it as one the
primary variables.
The review is organized into four parts: (1) the importance
of undertaking further steps in understanding the theoretical
meaning of catastrophizing, (2) de-constructing the main
identified key-features around the concept of catastrophizing
starting from early approaches to more recent conceptualizations,
(3) re-composition of all the key-features into one coherent view,
and (4) the implications of an integrative view of catastrophizing
at a theoretical, research, and clinical management level.
SETTING THE SCENE
Within pain literature, catastrophizing emerges as one of the
most robust and reliable predictor and correlate of adverse
pain experience (Sullivan et al., 2001a; Edwards et al., 2006;
Weissman-Fogel et al., 2008; Traxler et al., 2019). For example,
high levels of catastrophizing are associated with heightened
pain intensity, increased pain severity, and emotional distress
(Sullivan et al., 2001a; Turk and Okifuji, 2002; Keefe et al., 2004).
Studies have shown that catastrophizing is related to
higher levels of pain and suffering (Lackner and Quigley,
2005), increased need for medical advice, greater health-care
utilization (de Boer et al., 2012), increased disability (Picavet
et al., 2002), and worse outcome after surgery (Hovik et al.,
2016). Remarkably, pain catastrophizing is also associated
with pain outcomes in experimental pain studies in a pain-
free population (Edwards et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2010;
Kristiansen et al., 2014).
Although catastrophizing is viewed as a key element for
understanding variability in pain response, there are many
important questions to be answered about what catastrophizing
really is and why it occurs. For example, why are some people
trapped in catastrophic thinking, which is difficult to disengage
from?
Despite its increasing use in both clinical and experimental
studies, the concept of pain catastrophizing has often generated
silent concerns in relation to its definition and conceptualization.
Particularly important is to understand the nature and function
of the phenomenon that we refer to as pain catastrophizing.
There are several issues and shortcomings associated with the
concept of catastrophizing that result in a circular problem.
In experimental and clinical pain research, there is a tendency
to define pain catastrophizing merely and mainly as the
content of its measuring scales such as the catastrophizing
scale of the Coping Strategy Questionnaire (CSQ) (Rosenstiel
and Keefe, 1983) or the Pain Catastrophizing Scale (PCS)
(Sullivan et al., 1995). Unfortunately, this tendency has been
demonstrated to be flawed.
As questioned earlier by Turner and Aaron (2001), and
recently addressed by Crombez et al. (2020) none of the
pain catastrophizing scales can specifically measure pain
catastrophizing. Instead, the content of the pain catastrophizing
measures is better explained by pain-related worrying or pain-
related distress (Crombez et al., 2020).
These findings (Crombez et al., 2020) support the doubts
raised about whether pain catastrophizing measures assess pain
catastrophizing as defined in the cognitive-behavioral literature
(Turner and Aaron, 2001; Eccleston et al., 2012; Eccleston
and Crombez, 2017). In fact, many authors consider pain
catastrophizing as an extreme instance of worrying. This has
been previously suggested by psychological theories of anxiety
disorders (Davey and Levy, 1998). Within the anxiety literature,
the tendency to catastrophize has been identified as exacerbating
the adverse effects of pathological worry (Kendall and Ingram,
1987; Kendall and Hollon, 1989). Catastrophizing involves
“dwelling on the worst possible outcomes of any situation
in which there is a possibility of an unpleasant outcome”
(Beck and Emery, 1985).
Turner and Aaron (2001) emphasized the importance to
integrate the advancement in the field of anxiety and worry into
pain research in order to better understand the nature and the
function of pain catastrophizing.
Flink et al. (2013) published a stimulating paper that
integrated catastrophic worry into a novel conceptualization
of pain catastrophizing. The concept of catastrophic
worry was inspired by the literature on anxiety disorders
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(Borkovec et al., 1983; Davey and Levy, 1998) and combined
with new advances in pain research. This new concept considered
catastrophizing as a part of the worry process (Eccleston and
Crombez, 2007) highlighting the similarities between different
forms of repetitive negative thinking. This is driving a process of
clarification even though experimental studies testing this model
are still lacking.
If there are problems with the measuring instruments and the
definition of pain catastrophizing, then it is not surprisingly that
we observe incongruencies in treatments outcomes.
WHAT IS CATASTROPHIZING?
The first question that needs a unified answer is what is
catastrophizing?
The word has a strong connotation, is emphatic and tends to
magnify the meaning of the content. The word induces a strong
visual image especially if we turn our mind to a natural disaster.
One interpretation of a catastrophe used within emergency
services, is a disaster where the resources available exceed what
is required for its mitigation. That is perhaps an apt analogy to
catastrophizing pain patients where the pain exceeds the mental
capability of the patient to cope with the pain.
In the scientific literature, catastrophizing is generally seen
as a negative cognitive process. In the past, the construct of
catastrophizing has grown-up mostly in parallel within two
lines of research: (a) psychological research on anxiety and
depressive disorders, and (b) pain research. In recent years,
psychological research has also connected catastrophizing to
several psychological disturbances such as phobias, obsessive-
compulsive disorders, eating disorders, and many others.
In response to stress and anxiety some individuals focus
on the negative aspects of a situation and expect the worst
outcome (Ellis, 1962). This process is frequently referred with
many terminologies: cognitive errors, dysfunctional cognitions,
negative-self statement ideation, catastrophizing or simply
negative thinking (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 2005). These cognitive
aspects have been studied for many years in an attempt to
understand anxiety-related conditions and depression (Beck,
1976; Kendall and Ingram, 1987; Beck et al., 2005).
Likewise, similar cognitive processes have been identified
in response to laboratory and clinical pain conditions and
have been represented under the term pain catastrophizing,
which is often broadly conceived as an exaggerated mental
set brought to bear during painful experiences (Sullivan et al.,
2001b) without narrowing it down to the actual components. In
addition, very little is known about the differential effects of the
specific components of catastrophizing on pain-related outcomes
(Craner et al., 2016).
At present, the construct of pain catastrophizing has some
inbuilt theoretical problems that call for clarification. Although
pain catastrophizing is viewed as vital for understanding
variability in pain responses, there is no common theoretical
view on what pain catastrophizing really is and why it occurs.
Several competing theoretical frameworks have been suggested.
A schema-activation model appears to be a useful theoretical
framework by which to conceptualize the catastrophizing-pain
relationship, but unfortunately there is a debate about whether
catastrophizing should be viewed as a cognitive schemata, a
coping strategy or a personality trait (Gilliam et al., 2010).
Alternatively, pain catastrophizing has also been considered as
a communal coping response by which an individual utilizes
exaggerated pain expressions as a way of eliciting assistance or
empathic responses from others (Sullivan et al., 2001b).
Recently, pain catastrophizing has been reframed as an
unsuccessful problem-solving strategy (Eccleston and Crombez,
2007), or as a catastrophic worry (Flink et al., 2013). Catastrophic
worry is interpreted as a repetitive negative thinking strategy to
regulate negative emotional responses.
Despite all these models, the theoretical underpinning of
pain catastrophizing has not been extensively researched, instead
empirical research has merely used the construct of pain
catastrophizing as it has been framed by the PCS (Sullivan et al.,
2001b). Although several other assessment tools exist, such as
the Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CEQ) (Lefebvre, 1981), the
Coping Strategies Questionnaire (CSQ) (Rosenstiel and Keefe,
1983), Cognitive Coping Strategies Inventory (CCSI) (Butler et al.,
1989), Pain Cognition List (PCL) (Vlaeyen et al., 1990), and
Pain-Related Self-Statements Scale (PRSS) (Flor et al., 1993).
The PCS taps three dimensions of catastrophizing, which
are related with the predisposition to ruminate, magnify, and
feel helpless about pain (Sullivan et al., 1995). In this context,
catastrophizing is defined as an exaggerated negative mental set
brought to bear during actual or anticipated painful experience
(Sullivan et al., 2001b).
Broadly, pain catastrophizing is characterized by the tendency
to magnify the threat value of the pain stimulus and to feel
helpless in the context of pain, and by a relative inability to inhibit
pain-related thoughts in anticipation of, during or following a
painful event (Quartana et al., 2009).
In recent years, sporadic efforts have been made to unify these
different lines of research. Catastrophizing has been suggested as
a transdiagnostic construct identified across different disorders
(Linton, 2013; Gellatly and Beck, 2016).
DECOMPOSING CATASTROPHIZING
This section analyzes and decomposes psychological and pain-
related catastrophizing conceptualizations from early to recent
approaches in order to identify key-features and mechanisms.
Early Psychological Approaches to
Catastrophizing
Albert Ellis; Irrational Beliefs
Ellis (1962) coined the term catastrophizing within the
psychological framework of REBT (Rational Emotive
Behavior Therapy) as a factor that emerges in some forms
of psychopathology such as anxiety and depression. Ellis
proposed that both rational and irrational beliefs guide human
behaviors, goals, and actions, and in turn they affect emotional
responses. Ellis hypothesized that catastrophizing stemmed from
an underlying core of irrational belief. Irrational beliefs tend
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 December 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 603420
fpsyg-11-603420 December 10, 2020 Time: 20:46 # 5
Petrini and Arendt-Nielsen Pain Catastrophizing
to be an obstacle for achieving personal goals. For example,
having thoughts like this is awful; it is the end of the world, or
this treatment will ruin my life! will induce negative emotional
responses and prevent proper behaviors.
Here, catastrophizing is seen as a prediction of a negative
outcome, and as a forecast for the worst conclusion.
Catastrophizing is the primary element of emotional dysfunction
since in this view irrational ideas are assumed to be causing
psychological distress.
Aaron Beck; Cognitive Schemata and Automatic
Thoughts
After Ellis’s first observations, Beck (1976) (the father of cognitive
therapy, which is one the therapeutic approaches within the larger
group of cognitive behavioral therapy, CBT) used the construct
of catastrophizing within his cognitive theoretical models of
depression and anxiety to describe maladaptive cognitive styles
observed in patients affected by these disorders. Beck (1976) and
Beck et al. (2005) developed a model of cognitive distortions
where a central role was played by the activation of automatic
thoughts. According to this model, catastrophizing is considered
an automatic cognitive error. Catastrophizing was defined as the
tendency to anticipate danger, and to perceive a total disaster
(e.g., I won’t be able to function at all) as the most probable
outcome without considering other more likely consequences
(Beck et al., 2005).
In this view, some individuals automatically engage in
catastrophic cognitions when they are facing threatening
situations. Threatening situations trigger overemphasizing the
probability of a catastrophic outcome and exaggerate the
possible negative consequences of its occurrence (Beck, 1976;
Beck et al., 2005).
Other Psychological Approaches: The Role of
“Worry”
Psychologically, it is the perception of a threat that initiates
the anxiety response. Detecting a threat creates a problem to
solve, mainly in those situations where avoidance behaviors
are not possible. Thus, cognitive activity is the only tool
available. Cognitively, some individuals respond to a perceived
threat by worrying (Ruscio et al., 2001). Therefore, worry
is the cognitive attempt to solve the problem of a possible
future danger. Individuals use worry to avoid or to prepare
themselves to cope with future threat (Borkovec et al., 1983).
Indeed, anxious individuals believe that viewing events in
the most negative possible way is beneficial. For example, it
cannot get any worse than this, so if I am prepared for it,
then I will be prepared for anything (Borkovec et al., 1983).
In this way, thoughts are biased toward the most negative
and catastrophic outcomes. In the psychological literature,
worry has been defined as a chain of thoughts and images
negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable (Borkovec
et al., 1983), whereas catastrophizing has been identified as
the process that exacerbates the adverse effects of pathological
worry (Kendall and Ingram, 1987). Thus, excessive worry
occurs through the process of catastrophizing, in which
individuals persistently re-iterate the problematic features of
their worry topic. Catastrophizing involves the worrier to
persistently posing internal automatic questions: what if . . .?
(Kendall and Ingram, 1987).
The process of catastrophizing is per se not an effective method
since instead of bringing the worry problem to a solution it
leads to a progressively worse scenario (Hazlett-Stevens and
Craske, 2003). Davey and Levy (1998) identified the catastrophic
process with the term: catastrophic worry, which reflects personal
inadequacy and perseverative iterative style due to unsuccessful
attempts in problem solving. Vasey and Borkovec (1992) found
that chronic worriers generated more imagined catastrophes
than non-worriers, and that the process of catastrophizing was
associated with an increased negative affect.
Brief Summary
From these earlier psychological interpretations, catastrophizing
emerges as a key cognitive factor in emotional dysregulation.
Maladaptive cognitions (beliefs or schemas) contribute to the
maintenance of emotional distress and behavioral problems,
and give rise to specific and automatic thoughts, such
as catastrophizing. Especially, in situations where threat is
perceived or detected. Worry is related with catastrophizing
as “an automatic questioning style” (a “what if . . . happens”
style of thinking) that leads to a further distortion of the
appraisal of the threat.
Early Pain Research: Interpreting
Catastrophizing in Pain
In early pain research, there was an interest in investigating
factors responsible for variability in pain responses among
individuals subjected to an identical nociceptive stimulus
(Neblett, 2017). A behavioral dichotomy was consistently
observed based on the ability to tolerate pain. That is, individuals
that can tolerate pain for a short period of time as compared
with individuals that can tolerate pain for a long period of time
(Spanos and Brazil, 1984; Chen et al., 1989). When examined,
the two groups differed primarily in the type of cognitions
they reported during a pain experience (Chen et al., 1989).
Negative cognitions were observed in the most sensitive group.
Negative cognitions were identified by classifying participants
in catastrophizers or non-catastrophizers (Spanos et al., 1979;
Chaves and Brown, 1987). Catastrophizers were individuals
who reported worry, fearful, anxious thoughts, focused on,
and exaggerated the unpleasantness of the situation, and who
were unable to shift attention away from the pain. In line
with these investigations, catastrophizers had an enhanced pain
perception associated with worry and anxiety about the pain,
imaginative negative consequences, and thoughts about more
severe situations.
Brief Summary
In these early qualitative pain studies, catastrophizing
interpretations were inspired by the concepts of anxiety
and worry within the field of psychology. Catastrophizing
was associated with elements of pain related worry, fear,
magnification, and inability to cope with pain.
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Recent Pain Research: Pain
Catastrophizing – From Fear to Worry?
After these initial observations, there was a shift in pain research
into looking for important psychological determinants of chronic
pain adjustment. Catastrophizing was found to be an important
pain predictor, which could partially explain the relationship
between pain severity and adjustment. In the pain literature,
catastrophizing refers to a broader type of dysfunctional thinking
toward pain. This includes difficulty in shifting attention away
from pain, perceiving pain as unusually more intense, and feeling
helplessness in controlling pain (Sullivan et al., 1995). This
literature suggests that although depressive cognitive errors and
pain catastrophizing share some commonalities, catastrophizing
is a separate construct since it predicts pain outcome even
when depression is statistically controlled (Sullivan and Neish,
1998; Geisser et al., 1999; Keefe et al., 1999). Several theoretical
constructs have been proposed for pain catastrophizing, and
initiated a debate on whether it should have been considered
a coping strategy (Keefe et al., 1999), an appraisal model
(Haythornthwaite and Heinberg, 1999; Thorn et al., 1999), a
maladaptive pain belief (Geisser et al., 1999), a cognitive error
on the base of Beck’s view (Jensen et al., 1991), or a communal
copying strategy. Likewise, the importance to distinguish process
from outcome (Geisser et al., 1999) was also part of this
debate. Unfortunately, these discussions never concluded in a
definitive conceptual agreement on catastrophizing but instead
underlined the controversy over the meaning of this construct
(Geisser et al., 1999).
Table 1 shows an overview of the different theoretical
interpretations.
Meantime a variety of non-specific short-term cognitive
treatments have been shown to be effective in reducing
catastrophizing by pain patients. Although not specifically
intended to reduce catastrophizing, certain cognitive therapy
techniques that instructed patients to de-catastrophize, were
effective in a cognitive-behavioral approach for pain management
(James et al., 1993; Thorn et al., 2002, 2007).
At present, there is still a need for optimization of
psychological therapy for reducing pain-related catastrophizing
thinking. A recent review with meta-analyses (Schütze et al.,
2018) showed that different types of intervention techniques are
capable to reduce pain catastrophizing, nevertheless the estimate
of these changes indicated only a modest effect. Surprisingly, the
results showed that not only interventions designed to target
pain catastrophizing (such as cognitive restructuring in CBT)
reduced pain catastrophizing but also other types of treatment
approach, such as physical exercise or combination of CBT and
physical exercise. In addition, these findings suggested that high
levels of heterogeneity among interventions, missing information
regarding the manualization included in the treatment, and
the lack of a consensus about the theoretical construct of pain
catastrophizing make difficult to evince conclusive results.
In parallel to this debate, a new model, within the
biopsychosocial framework, the fear-avoidance model (Vlaeyen
and Linton, 2000; Vlaeyen et al., 2016) was developed. This
model provided a description of the path followed by individuals
experiencing acute pain, who may, subsequently, become trapped
into a vicious cycle of chronicity and suffering.
In the fear-avoidance model, catastrophizing was
conceptualized as a cognitive key element for generating fear
and avoidance behaviors. Indeed, catastrophizing was identified
as the turning point at which individuals either enter or not
enter the fear-avoidance cycle. The cycle is initiated if pain is
misinterpreted as a catastrophe. Catastrophic misinterpretations
of pain lead to an extreme fear of experiencing more pain or
having a (re)injury, which progressively extend to the fear of




Catastrophizing is seen a part of the pattern of thoughts (schemata) that guide cognitive processes
and behaviors.
Catastrophizing is seen as a negative or unwanted thought.
Beck and Emery (1985)
Coping strategy Catastrophizing is seen as a cognitive effort to manage specific external and/or internal demands
brought on by pain experiences that are appraised as burdensome.
Keefe et al. (1999)
Maladaptive pain belief Catastrophizing is defined as cognition (thoughts) on pain problems.
Maladaptive beliefs about pain – for example that pain is a signal of damage or harm to the body or
that pain is disabling.
Geisser et al. (1999)
Secondary appraisal Catastrophizing is seen as the evaluation of the ability to cope with the situation – credence on
coping capabilities.




Catastrophizing is seen as stable characteristic of the individual (personality-based) that is present
across different situations.
Catastrophizing is seen as a response that varies over time and is determined by situational factors.
Sullivan et al. (2001b)
Communal coping
strategy
Catastrophizing is seen as a way to elicit and/or maximize social support. Sullivan et al. (2001b)
Misdirected
problem-solving
Catastrophizing is seen as part of the worry process that has the function to actively solve a
problem. In this context, catastrophizing is seen as an unsuccessful problem-solving strategy.
Eccleston and Crombez (2007)
Catastrophic worry
process
Catastrophizing is seen as a repetitive negative thinking which is abstract, intrusive, and difficult to
disengage.
It is seen as a mediator of emotional regulation.
Flink et al. (2013) and Linton
(2013)
BIS–BAS model of pain Catastrophizing is seen as BIS-related cognition, within individual personality traits characteristics. Jensen et al. (2016)
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physical movements, and finally to a total avoidance of movement
and activity. Long-term avoidance of physical activity has several
consequences, from impairing functioning and by making an
individual more physically weak, to increase negative mood that
contributes to create a psychological feeling of disability, which
if protracted can lead to depression. Consequently, the model
explains how a susceptible individual enters in a dangerous
loop of pain amplification and disability based on the tendency
of an individual to catastrophize (Vlaeyen and Linton, 2000;
Vlaeyen et al., 2016).
Although the fear-avoidance model has been successful and
numerous studies have supported the role of catastrophizing in
maintaining dysfunctional behaviors responsible of chronicity
and disability (Keefe et al., 2000; Severeijns et al., 2001; Hirsh
et al., 2011), continuing research questioned the sequential
relationship proposed by the original model (Pincus et al., 2010;
Slepian et al., 2020). Thus, pain catastrophizing might not be seen
as an important driving factor in this model.
In addition, the model did not consider or explain why
some individuals catastrophize, and whether they all express
or experience fear (Asmundson and Katz, 2009). In relation
to the latter, it has been argued that individuals might
experience a future oriented threat, which is better described
as an anxiety emotional response rather than a fear emotional
response (Asmundson and Katz, 2009). Although the differences
between fear and anxiety could be blurred and the terms used
interchangeably; fear and anxiety are different. Both responses
are necessary components of adaptive behavior, but whereas
fear is characterized by a response to a present-oriented-
threat stimulus, anxiety is a response to a future-oriented-threat
stimulus. Therefore, it has been suggested that it would be more
appropriate to describe these behaviors in terms of pain related
anxiety (Asmundson and Katz, 2009).
Since it is the perception of threat that initiates the anxiety
process, then it is reasonable to suggest that worry is one
of the significant ways in which individuals respond to the
perceived threat. As discussed previously, worry has the function
to prioritize threat and promote problem solving. Therefore,
catastrophizing should be considered within the worry context.
Often, people with pain perceive pain as a signal of aversive
threat, and want to find a solution for their condition, a
solution that unfortunately, cannot be found (Aldrich et al.,
2000). Consequently, these patients perceive pain as an unsolved
problem (Aldrich et al., 2000). It has been suggested that this
experience is phenomenologically similar to worrying, where
no immediate solution is available (Crombez et al., 2012).
Taking this into consideration, new conceptualizations of pain
catastrophizing have indicated worry as a central element to
characterize catastrophizing. Aldrich et al. (2000) have re-framed
the negative and threatening thinking about chronic pain within
the context of worry. Chronic pain is re-represented as chronic
vigilance to the threat of pain that leads to perseverative attempts
at solving the problem of escaping from pain. The prolonged
experience of inescapable pain generates high level of awareness
about one’s body (Bacon et al., 1994), high difficulty to disengage
from pain (Van Damme et al., 2004), and high levels of symptoms
reporting (Ciccone et al., 1996). Furthermore, the repeated
attempts to solve an insoluble problem provoke frustration
and increase self-referent negative thinking that may become
cognitively fixed or locked within self-perpetuating rumination
(Aldrich et al., 2000).
Eccleston and Crombez (2007) proposed a new model of pain-
related worry that was explained as a form of misdirected problem
solving. In this model, worry motivates patients in engaging in
possible solutions to resolve the pain, but when the solution
attempts fail, worry is regenerated to establish new problem-
solutions. The patient is therefore trapped in a perseverative loop
of misdirected problem solving with no ending.
In addition, Flink et al. (2013) and Linton (2013) outlined the
importance of including worry as part of the catastrophic process,
by introducing the term catastrophic worry (Davey and Levy,
1998), to emphasize the notion that pain catastrophizing has
an in-built relation with worry, as suggested in the misdirected
problem-solving model (Eccleston and Crombez, 2007), together
with the assumption that catastrophizing has a coping function,
as suggested in the communal coping model (Sullivan et al.,
2001b). In this new integrated view, catastrophic worry is
proposed as a form of negative repetitive thinking, which has the
purpose to reduce negative emotions triggered by pain or by other
stimuli (exteroceptive or interoceptive).
However, as argued earlier, engaging in catastrophic worry is
an infective strategy, since it does not produce any real solution to
the problem, but only a cognitive avoidance of the threat through
a perseverative thinking activity (catastrophic worry process).
Individuals engaging in catastrophic worry hold beliefs that this
activity will reduce negative emotions triggered by pain or other
somatic stimuli. In this context, catastrophic worry is seen as a
mediator of emotional regulation, a process aimed to reduce the
effects of negative emotions.
Paradoxically, as it will be discussed later, engaging in
catastrophic worry produces instead an opposite effect, which
magnifies the emotional-pain related response leading to a
reinforcement of the catastrophic worry cycle.
In our opinion, explaining pain catastrophizing as an
emotional regulator has many advantages and can be a very
useful framework to elucidate mechanisms of pain chronicity and
disability. This will be discussed further in the next paragraphs.
Empirical Support in Pain Research
Studies are supporting the view that worry plays a central role in
the cognitive and emotional framework of chronic pain patients.
In an early study (Eccleston et al., 2001), patients with chronic
pain reported that pain-related worries were intrusive, attentional
demanding, difficult to stop, and distressing. The study also
provided an analysis of the content of worry, which included both
pain-related and non-pain related worries. The most common
theme of pain-related worry was medical uncertainty (e.g., is this
a new pain? why has the intervention made it worse?), followed by
disability (e.g., I can’t do the ironing), pain experience (e.g., this
pain just keeps hurting), and negative affect (e.g., I am useless).
The study broadly supports the view of Aldrich et al. (2000) for
how a normal response to somatic threat exacerbates the suffering
associated with chronic pain. The results show that worrying
about threat continues to maintain vigilance on the object of
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threat (Mogg et al., 1990; Hirsh et al., 2011). In other words,
worrying about chronic pain maintains the vigilance for pain,
resulting in a persisting feeding of the perceptual threat.
Other empirical investigations are supporting the view that
worry about chronic pain may promote awareness to an
insoluble problem. In this perspective, chronic pain patients
are not passive victims of anxiety, but are active participants
engaged in a constant process of evaluating and interpreting
threats, their possible consequences, and potential solutions
(De Vlieger et al., 2006).
Likewise, a study from De Vlieger et al. (2006) supports the
idea that worry is a common feature in chronic pain patients.
Remarkably, worry does not seem to have a psychopathological
component in these patients, as it has been found in individuals
with generalized anxiety disorders. Chronic pain patients do not
show deficits in general problem-solving appraisal or confidence.
Instead, what emerges as atypical, is the extent to which patients
attempt to engage in solving an insoluble problem. The idea
that worry operates as an experiential avoidance for controlling
emotional-related threatening information associated with pain
is further supported by a study of Lackner and Quigley (2005).
Their study showed that chronic pain patients with high levels
of worry engage in more catastrophic thinking leading these
patients to experience more pain and suffering.
Recent Psychological Approaches: The
Role of “Rumination”
Rumination and worry, although they share many features in
common and can be experienced together, should be considered
two separate and distinguishable forms of negative thinking
(Fresco et al., 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
In general terms, rumination is a form of circular thinking that
swallows the individual in a path without a way out, and it can
be broadly defined as perseverative self-focused thinking process,
whereby an individual goes over and over the same thoughts in
his or her mind. This process generally interferes with a person’s
ability to inhibit thoughts, generate alternative ways of thinking,
and switch the focus of attention. Consequently, rumination
is a process of perseverative thinking about one’s feelings and
problems. Although, there is not yet a common theoretical view
about rumination (Smith and Alloy, 2009), the most accredited
model is the one proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema in the Response
Style Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). According to this model,
rumination is a way of response to distress. Rumination involves
repetitively and passively focusing on distress symptoms as well
as on their possible causes and consequences.
Alike worry, rumination does not lead to an active problem
solving. Individuals, who ruminate, remain fixated on their
problems and feelings without taking actions (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008). In this way, rumination interferes in engaging in
effective problem solving and inhibits the initiation of positive
behaviors, because it makes negative cognitions more accessible
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
Empirical Support in Pain Research
At present, only few studies have investigated the direct link of
rumination and chronic pain. Clinical observations suggest that
patients with chronic pain spend a lot of time ruminating about
their pain (Edwards et al., 2011).
Qualitative studies that have analyzed the content of
ruminative thoughts have shown that chronic pain patients held
a number of positive beliefs about rumination (e.g., helping
in coping, problem-solving, and avoiding repeating mistakes)
as well as negative beliefs (e.g., rumination is uncontrollable)
(Edwards et al., 2011; Schütze et al., 2017).
Individuals, which are prone to ruminate, experience
prolonged dysphoric reactions to problems, and they are
more negatively biased in interpreting and solving problems
(Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008). In addition, the hypothesis that metacognitions
(beliefs about their own thinking and their own coping strategy)
may influence the selection of rumination is common in
many theories [Response styles theory (RST), Stress-Reactive
Rumination (S-REF), the Goal-Progress Model, Post-Event
Processing] (Smith and Alloy, 2009).
Recent studies support the importance of the metacognitive
aspect of rumination when characterizing pain catastrophizing
(Schütze, 2016; Schütze et al., 2020). Many pain patients with
high levels of catastrophizing believe that rumination help to
solve problems and to prepare handling future threats, even when
the sense of uncontrollability over ruminative thoughts produces
negative consequences on mental health (Schütze et al., 2017).
In addition, quantitative studies using the PCS have
shown that the different PCS sub-categories, such as
rumination, magnification, and helplessness, might be better in
explaining the associations between pain and disability when
examined independently.
Rumination has been associated with symptoms magnification
and poor clinical outcome (Sansone and Sansone, 2012), it
has been seen as a major predictor in the severity of patients’
disability, and it has been strongly correlated with pain intensity
ratings (Sullivan and Neish, 1998). In addition, cross-sectional
studies have shown that rumination PCS sub-scale was able
to differentiate between pain patients from healthy volunteers
(Osman et al., 2000), and that rumination and helplessness sub-
scales, but not magnification, were correlated with bodily pain
(Nijs et al., 2008).
Although the PCS can help to provide evidence about the
presence of rumination in pain patients, it does not provide any
information about the causes or content of rumination. Recently,
a pain metacognition questionnaire assessing beliefs underlying
rumination about pain has been developed (Schütze et al., 2019).
This additional tool can help future clinical and experimental
research to clarify ruminative style in pain.
Catastrophizing as an Emotional
Regulator
A way to understand how catastrophizing impacts pain
perception is to conceptualize it as part of the emotional regulator
process. Pain is an emotional experience. Thus, understanding
how individuals use various emotion regulation strategies in
daily life, and how these strategies affect pain-related emotional
experience on short- and long-term is an important factor.
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Emotion regulation refers to a process by which individuals
can influence the course and expression of their emotions (Gross,
1998, 2002), and it is essential for maintaining a healthy life.
Conversely, emotion dysregulation characterizes mood, anxiety,
and pain disorders (Breivik et al., 2014).
Gross (1998) distinguishes two important groups of strategies
to regulate elicited emotions: (i) re-appraisal, characterized by
modifying the meaning of an emotional stimulus; and (ii)
suppression, characterized by inhibiting or reducing the emotion-
expressive behavior elicited by a stimulus. Research has shown
that reappraisal is more efficient than suppression in reducing
negative emotional experience (Gross and Levenson, 1997).
It is argued that rumination and worry instantiate a
superordinate process known as repetitive negative thinking
(Fresco et al., 2002). Repetitive negative thinking is defined as
a style of thinking about one’s problems (current, past or future)
or negative experience (past or anticipated) that is repetitive, at
least partly intrusive, and is difficult to disengage from (Ehring and
Watkins, 2008; Ehring et al., 2011).
Repetitive negative thinking is considered a form of
avoidant copying strategy (Stroebe et al., 2007; Flink et al.,
2013), and individuals engage in this thinking to prevent
confrontation with worse feelings and thoughts (Stroebe
et al., 2007). Occupying one’s thoughts with repetitive
negative thinking prevents confrontation with the threat.
For example: what I could have done to prevent this situation?
In addition, repetitive negative thinking can be negatively
reinforced by abstract cognitive activity; for example: Why
do I suffer from pain? This form of abstract thinking impedes
activation and processing of emotional and somatic responses
(Flink et al., 2013).
Flink et al. (2013) proposed to re-conceptualize pain
catastrophizing as form of repetitive negative thinking. Pain
patients engage in catastrophizing or repetitive negative thinking
to reduce the aversive physiological and psychological aspects of
the threatening pain-related situation. This conceptualization is
very similar to the definition from psychological literature on
worry and anxiety.
The authors labeled this form of thinking catastrophic worry.
The introduction of the term catastrophic worry is to our
view quite appropriate since from one side it incorporates
this superordinate process of repetitive negative thinking; from
the other side, it underlines the similarities with other forms
of repetitive negative thinking, such as worry, rumination
and catastrophizing, that we have observed in the literature.
Furthermore, it reinforces the emerging transdiagnostic literature
that wants to identify common processes among different
disorders (Linton, 2013; Gellatly and Beck, 2016).
It has been hypothesized that patients engage in catastrophic
worry in an attempt to downregulate negative emotions arising
from a stressful situation such as persistent pain or distress (Flink
et al., 2013; Linton, 2013).
Regulatory strategies employed by emotion and pain are
surprisingly similar (Linton and Bergbom, 2011; Linton,
2013). Strategies for pain control also include distraction, re-
appraisal, withdrawal/avoidance, self-reward, and suppression
(Linton, 2013).
Empirical Support in Pain Research
Individuals with excessive worrying show deficits in emotion
regulation. Specifically, they seem to not be able to accept negative
emotions (Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006) and as a consequence
they show an increase in negative affect and dysfunctional beliefs
(Le Borgne et al., 2017).
Recent experimental studies support the hypothesis that
an active emotional manipulation would directly influence
the experience of pain. For example, Lefebvre et al. (2017)
demonstrated that a manipulation of emotions had significant
effects on the experience of worry about pain, and that a direct
manipulation of pain-related worry increased pain intensity
(Lefebvre and Jensen, 2019).
In addition, suppression was found to mediate the relationship
between negative affect and pain catastrophizing (Wong and
Fielding, 2013). Gilliam et al. (2010) showed that catastrophizers
tend to suppress negative emotion and, as a consequence of
this mechanism, experience prolonged recovery and long-term
adjustment to pain.
Similar results were also reported in an experimental
manipulation of suppression, where catastrophizers
reported increased muscle tension at the site of injury
(Quartana et al., 2007).
Although suppression might seem a positive adaptive strategy,
since the goal is to keep the emotion and/or pain out of the
mind, several studies have shown that this process often produces
the opposite effect (Magee et al., 2012). Indeed, attempts to
suppress unwanted thoughts, including those regarding pain and
distress, may paradoxically increase awareness and salience of the
thoughts and feelings that an individual wants to avoid (Wegner
et al., 1987). Efforts to suppress pain-related thoughts either
during or prior to pain had the unintended effect of increasing
reports of pain severity in comparison with individuals who
did not attempt to suppress pain (Cioffi and Holloway, 1993;
Sullivan, 1997).
To our view, the process of suppression/avoidance could in
fact magnify the negative emotions and consequently fuel the
catastrophic worry cycle.
Behavioral Inhibition and Activation
Systems (BIS/BAS) in Emotion
Regulation
If catastrophic worry is a form of emotional regulatory process,
the question is then what factors contribute to the development
and maintenance of catastrophizing or catastrophic worry? In
simple words: what factors make an individual more prone to
catastrophize?
Recently, Jensen et al. (2016, 2017) proposed the BIS–BAS
model of pain where key psychological factors are used to
predict pain responses and behaviors. The model is derived from
Gray’s biological personality theory (Reinforcement Sensitivity
Theory, RST), which postulates two main dimensions of
personality: anxiety proneness and impulsivity (Gray, 1982,
1987). According to this theory, individual differences in
personality and behavior can be explained by the activity
of two distinct neurophysiological systems, the BIS and BAS
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that coordinate adaptive behaviors in response to relevant
environmental cues. BAS regulates appetitive motivation whereas
BIS regulates aversive motivation. The BIS–BAS system has been
related with the neurobiological activity of the motivational and
reward system in the brain.
Behavioral inhibition system is sensitive to signals of danger
and punishment by detecting threatening possible stimuli or
events and enhances avoidance behavior (suppression). BAS,
instead, is sensitive to signals of reward, non-punishment, and
escape from punishment by encouraging approach behaviors (re-
appraisal). Since pain is usually perceived as a threatening and/or
punishing stimulus, the BIS–BAS model of pain hypothesized
that the BIS system is involved in pain (Jensen et al., 2016).
Several studies have shown that different types of BIS–BAS
sensitivity are associated with specific clinical pathologies. For
example, people with a sensitive BIS are prone to present
problems of anxiety and depression (Maack et al., 2012; Hundt
et al., 2013), and tend to worry and ruminate (Corr, 2004) due
to excessive attention to cues related to negative events. BIS
facilitates negative emotions and enables behavioral interruption
and inhibition. BAS reactivity is associated with an orientation
toward reward and impulsivity. BAS is also linked to positive
affect (Meyer and Hofmann, 2005). However, people with highly
sensitive BAS are particularly vulnerable to the development of
addictive behaviors (Pardo et al., 2007).
Empirical Support in Pain Research
Within chronic pain research, the BIS–BAS model can potentially
provide an important framework for understanding and
explaining differences in pain related-cognitions, emotions, and
behaviors (Jensen et al., 2016, 2017).
Recent studies have started reporting interesting results
when examining associations among key pain-related cognitions,
emotions, and behaviors and the BIS–BAS model of pain.
Pain catastrophizing, symptoms of depression and anxiety, as
well as pain-related avoidance behaviors have been suggested to
be BIS-related features (Day et al., 2019). A trait tendency
toward BIS sensitivity has shown to be associated with
pain catastrophizing (Muris et al., 2007), whereas lower
BAS sensitivity has been found in fibromyalgia patients
(Becerra-García and Jurado, 2014). In addition, reward
responsiveness has shown to be reduced in chronic pain patients
(Elvemo et al., 2015).
Emotional responses also appear to be modulated differently
depending on whether the BIS or BAS system is more active.
Individuals show trait differences in the activity of the two
systems (De Pascalis et al., 2013), which can explain alteration
in emotional regulation and in the tendency to catastrophize.
BIS activity characterizes passive and fearful behavioral
tendencies, including introversion, depression, anxiety,
and pain (Merchan-Clavellino et al., 2019). Interestingly, a
psychophysiological study (Jensen et al., 2015a) has found an
association between pain catastrophizing vulnerability and
frontal alpha asymmetry as a marker of BIS activity in patients
with spinal cord injury and chronic pain. This provides an
association between emotional regulatory disturbances and
BIS–BAS activity.
Results from a recent study show that chronic pain individuals
with higher BIS use suppression techniques (Serrano-Ibáñez
et al., 2018). Other studies have also found associations between
BIS and emotion regulation difficulties (Markarian et al., 2013;
Zohreh and Ghazal, 2018).
From the BIS–BAS perspective, it has been suggested that
catastrophizing could reflect the BIS-related cognitive content
and process (Jensen et al., 2016). The BIS system has been
hypothesized to be the neurophysiological system underlying
psychological traits such as catastrophizing. Consequently,
according to this hypothesis, the BIS system activates or
facilitates these types of cognitive responses when facing pain
(Jensen et al., 2015b, 2016).
Based on the association of BIS with behavioral inhibition
and withdrawal, new studies are also supporting a relationship
between pain and BIS (Jensen et al., 2017), and BIS and threat
detection (Ávila and Torrubia, 2006). In a study from Jensen
et al. (2015b), higher levels of pain intensity and more frequent
headaches were both associated with higher BIS scores, and
this association was significantly higher in individuals reporting
severe headaches.
BIS and BAS systems have been suggested to be involved in
the regulation of the activity in the autonomic nervous system
(Beauchaine, 2001). Empirical studies have suggested that both
anxiety and depression are characterized by heightened BIS
activity and reduction of vagal tone (Beauchaine et al., 2007).
Catastrophic Worry and Interoceptive
Sensitivity
The fluctuating physiological state of the body can influence how
individuals interpret the world (Garfinkel and Critchley, 2016).
Interoception is defined as the sense of the physiological condition
of the body, i.e., conscious awareness, emotional processes, and
behavior related to afferent physiological information arising
from the body (Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2003). Converging
evidence are also suggesting the importance of interoception and
pain (Nakamura and Chapman, 2002; Craig, 2003). Interoceptive
sensitivity has been suggested to play a key role in the etiology
and maintenance of state and trait anxiety, anxiety sensitivity, and
anxiety disorders.
Patients with increased anxiety sensitivity generally report
hypervigilance for somatic sensations (De Berardis et al.,
2007; Olatunji et al., 2007; Anderson and Hope, 2009).
A consequence of this hypervigilance is an increased self-report
of somatic sensations, and a dysfunctional cognitive appraisal
of these sensations with a bias toward a danger- related and
catastrophizing interpretational style (Beck et al., 2005).
Negative emotions can be intensified or misinterpreted
by physiological arousal, which can lead to catastrophic
interpretation in anxiety and panic disorders
(Teachman et al., 2010). An increased arousal observed
in anxiety disorders has been observed affecting the
inhibitory activity of the parasympathetic nervous system
(Friedman and Thayer, 1998).
Perception of somatic sensations and subsequent
catastrophizing interpretations of these sensations are
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particularly related to interoceptive stimuli arising from
the cardiac system. Indeed, it has been proposed as a
physiological mechanism underlying the link between worry and
cardiovascular health. According to the neurovisceral integration
model, vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) has
been suggested as an index of emotion regulatory capacity and
threat perception (Thayer and Lane, 2000). A reduction in HRV
represents a breakdown of the inhibitory influences that allows
for efficient self-emotional regulation.
Empirical Support in Pain Research
Poor emotional regulation capacities have been associated with
worry and heart rate variability (HRV). Deschênes et al. (2016)
showed that catastrophic worry was associated with decrease
of HRV, whereas Koenig et al. (2016) found that chronic pain
patients with high levels of catastrophizing were associated with
low level of vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV).
RE-COMPOSING CATASTROPHIZING: A
PROPOSED INTEGRATIVE VIEW
Many psychological and pain-driven theories have included
catastrophizing as a central construct involved in pain and
affective disturbances. We have deconstructed common elements
that emerge from different theoretical models, with the aim to
understand the concept of catastrophizing and its role in pain
processing. Based on analysis of the literature, important key-
elements emerge as fundamental to explain pain catastrophizing:
emotional regulation, catastrophic worry (as repetitive negative
thinking), rumination, BIS system, and interoceptive sensitivity.
Self-emotional regulatory mechanism emerges as an
important process in individuals with chronic pain, due to
the association with pain and negative emotions. Emotional
regulation is a relative new construct in the chronic pain
literature but it is important for understanding how pain
patients modulate and express their emotional state, which
includes which emotions an individual has, when she/he has
these emotions, and how she/he experiences and expresses these
emotions (Gross and Thompson, 2007). Data from a recent
systematic-review (Koechlin et al., 2018) show that a small but
growing number of studies are suggesting that maladaptive
emotional regulation might be a risk factor for the development
of chronic pain.
From the literature, we can isolate a common process,
catastrophic worry (or repetitive negative thinking), which occurs
when people have difficulties dealing with negative emotions. We
can hypothesize that in pain patients any somatic or noxious
sensations from the body will generate negative emotions, which
at the same time trigger a catastrophic worry process (a what if . . .
questioning style: What if this pain doesn’t go away? What if the
pain is a sign of a terrible disease? What if I will never be functional
again?). The catastrophic worry cycle is continuously reinforced
through a self-focused ruminative process. The function of the
catastrophic worry is to reduce negative emotions. Paradoxically,
this way of processing the information increases the attention and
focus on the pain that an individual wants to suppress, with the
result of magnifying the problem and providing more fuel to an
everlasting cycle. Furthermore, the catastrophic worry per se can
become its own stressor to sustain the continuous cycle.
In addition, we suggest that individuals with high activity
in the BIS are also the ones engaging in more catastrophic
worry. Since BIS and catastrophic worry are both associated
with emotional regulatory difficulties (Serrano-Ibáñez et al., 2018,
2019a), it is likely to suppose that these individuals will account
differently in response to the pain experience from patients with
a low BIS activity/catastrophic worry.
Since HRV has been suggested as an index of functional
integrity of the neural networks implicated in the emotion-
cognitive interaction (Park and Thayer, 2014) and self-regulatory
capacity (Butler et al., 2006), we hypothesize that catastrophic
worry individuals will have a lower HRV associated with
hypervigilant and maladaptive cognitive responses to emotional
stimuli, which impact on emotion regulative capacity.
Recent findings on placebo analgesia responders (De Pascalis
and Scacchia, 2019) supported a negative link between HRV time-
related changes and EEG-delta activity and pain reduction when
reward interest was the mediator factor, suggesting that pain
reduction could reflect the individual ability to self-regulate both
sensorial and emotional components of pain.
DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The analysis of the literature has shown that a number of
key-factors such as emotional regulation, catastrophic worry,
rumination, BIS–BAS systems, and interoceptive sensitivity are
related to catastrophizing. We have suggested an integrated view
of pain catastrophizing that attempts to incorporate all these
factors as interconnected processes.
Possibly, the phenomenon that we observe in certain pain
patients, and we refer to as pain catastrophizing is much more
complex, and it is the result of several interconnected processes
and mechanisms. The analysis presented in this review shows
that there is a complex interplay of psychosocial and biological
mechanisms involved in pain catastrophizing.
Moving forward, research should incorporate all
aforementioned key-elements possibly tested as an integrated
model of catastrophizing. The one we have proposed may
be likely, but other interconnections could exist, and clearly
empirical and clinical research is required to test this model.
From our perspective, this integrative model of catastrophizing
can generate new hypotheses testing that cannot emerge from
taking into consideration each single model at the time. Thus,
providing a testable biopsychosocial approach.
Additionally, evidence suggests that pain catastrophizing
scales cannot provide valid measures of pain catastrophizing
(Crombez et al., 2020), but instead a person-centered approach
would be a better way for understanding this process. By
differentiating several key components, our model offers a better
framework for an individualized approach. These components
relate to repetitive negative thinking (Davey and Levy, 1998),
catastrophic worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; Flink et al., 2013;
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Linton, 2013), personality characteristics related to BIS profiles
(Corr, 2008; Jensen et al., 2016, 2017), and interoceptive
sensitivity (Thayer and Lane, 2000; Deschênes et al., 2016; Koenig
et al., 2016). However, these elements can be expanded and/or
integrated into other existing models such as expectancies about
future pain and disability (Peerdeman et al., 2016), attentional
bias (Eccleston and Crombez, 1999; Van Damme et al., 2010) or
cognitive intrusion (Attridge et al., 2015).
At present, it seems possible to hypothesize that pain
catastrophizing and catastrophic worry share similarities.
However, the first research question to answer is whether chronic
pain patients engage in catastrophic worry processes. Exploring
the worry and ruminative contents is also very important to
underline the thinking style of these patients. Nonetheless, future
research should directly test whether individuals with BIS-related
profiles are more prone to catastrophize, and whether pain
catastrophizing can be conceptualized as an emotional regulator.
Viewing catastrophizing as an emotional regulatory strategy
(Flink et al., 2013; Linton, 2013) will enable us to understand the
cognitive-affective processes associated with the pain experience,
and to develop more tailored psychological interventions that
target catastrophic worry individuals, probably the ones with
BIS-related profiles (Serrano-Ibáñez et al., 2019a,b).
Indeed, future clinical and experimental research should
further assess the relationship between the BIS and the BAS
systems and catastrophic worry. The BIS–BAS model of pain
is also a relatively new model and it is mainly based on
Gray’s original RST (Gray, 1982), in which the main BIS
function is to regulate aversive motivation. Over the years, the
theory has been revised and reconceptualized in three different
components: BIS, BAS and FFFS (fight-flight-freezing-system).
FFFS mediates fear-related responses to all aversive stimuli and
produces avoidance and escape behaviors. BIS instead mediates
anxiety-related responses and is responsible for detecting and
resolving conflict between approach and avoidance (Gray and
McNaughton, 2000; Corr, 2008). Jensen’s model (Jensen et al.,
2016) is based on measures of BIS (Carver and White, 1994),
that lacks separation between BIS-anxiety and FFFS-fear (fight-
flight-freezing-system) (Corr and Cooper, 2016; De Pascalis et al.,
2019). This theoretical differentiation could provide us greater
insight when considering worry and anxiety as part of pain
catastrophizing. Additionally, it could account for inconsistent
findings when relating BIS scale to placebo and nocebo effects
(Corsi and Colloca, 2017).
Finally, the BAS scale has no clear theoretical justification
for its subdivision in three components, drive, reward
responsiveness, and fun-seeking (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013).
Therefore, further research is required to shed more light on the
role of the BIS and BAS in pain.
We also suggest that further research could include
psychophysiological biomarkers such as EEG/ERP and vagal
mediated heart rate variability in order to increase objective
assessments of biological mechanisms of pain catastrophizing.
Recent research is highlighting intriguing possibilities (Jensen
et al., 2015a; Deschênes et al., 2016; Koenig et al., 2016; De
Pascalis and Scacchia, 2019).
Studies designed to test specific hypotheses regarding the
mechanisms and processes that are behind pain catastrophizing
will be extremely beneficial, since they will enable us to identify
vulnerable or potential vulnerable individuals. Research that
seeks to disentangle risk and vulnerability factors that contribute
to pain chronicity is fundamental, as well as it is fundamental
to have multidisciplinary theoretical frameworks for studying
and analyzing these factors. Current pain research supports
the importance of integrating psychological factors in these
frameworks (Jensen and Turk, 2014).
Understanding the mechanisms and the underlying
psychological dynamics will allow us to develop tailored
psychological-pain related interventions that can be beneficial
for specific patient characteristics. Currently, it seems probable
that treatments that teach patients emotional regulation strategies
could potentially reduce the negative impact of BIS activation on
the ability to live with chronic pain (Serrano-Ibáñez et al., 2018).
Nonetheless, future research should explore this link directly.
We believe that it is essential that we expand our knowledge
in the territory of psychology and pain. Pain specialists should
be able to operate using several tools that have proven useful
in managing pain patients independently from their background
orientation. Furthermore, these tools should be shared with all
health care pain-related professionals. Regrettably, surveys are
showing that although medical providers are recognizing the
value of the biopsychosocial model of pain treatment, they appear
to be lacking in operationalizing this model in their practice
(Darnall et al., 2016, 2017). Pain psychologists could help in
complementing this lack since they are more used to work within
this conceptual framework. We believe that this will be highly
beneficial for both clinicians and researchers in broadening up
their approach to chronic pain.
CONCLUSION
Pain is a health problem that requires a more interdisciplinary
approach than do many other medical conditions. The experience
of pain and the response to pain are the product of interrelated
biological and psychosocial dynamics.
Pain catastrophizing is an important psychological factor that
influences pain response and disability, but paradoxically no
conceptual agreement is available at present that can explain what
catastrophizing really is. From the literature, we identified several
components that could clarify the construct of catastrophizing.
We also presented an integrated view that can illustrate the
complex interplay of biological and psychosocial factors that can
shape pain vulnerability, and which can become risks factors to
individuals that are prone to catastrophize.
Taken together, the present findings provide support to
the view that pain catastrophizing is an emotional regulator
strategy, a catastrophic worry, constituting an interplay between
a ruminative process and personality trait characteristics related
to the BIS system.
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